i've had independent conversations with friends who have said they feel like the outsider of a group. when i ask them to describe who the core of a group is, each ends up listing the other that had described herself as the outsider. essentially a group ends up consisting of a bunch of people who think they're the one on the outside while thinking the rest of the people are a cohesive whole.One can observe an exactly analogous phenomenon if you go up to sociologists and ask them who a "mainstream sociologist" is.
With regard to Ang & Martine's back-and-forth crush discussion: although JFW rarely weighs in on any matters of the heart, two points do have to be made:
1. As a matter of mathematical necessity, the average crush of the average person is of a sort where the crushee is the object of more crushes-by-other-people than the crusher. The proof is left as an exercise for those bloggers who occasionally burst into calculus.
2. Crushes are always known to the crusher and only occasionally known to the crushee. To be the sort of person who would sit down and count as many outgoing crushes and incoming crushes, you would--not quite by mathematical necessity--have to have either a massive crushee:crusher ratio or be the sort of person who often falsely judges her/himself to be a crushed object.
6 comments:
Okay, I admit it. I have no idea what you're saying in point #1.
Also, all of your friends have more friends than you.
As Lago suspects, point #1 is the extension of the "your friends have more friends than you" point to the domain of crushes. On average, if A has a crush on B, there are more other people who have crushes on B than crushes on A.
I didn't say that people I have crushes on don't have crushes on other people; all I said was that they're not crushes on me.
So this is the point that "had to be made?" That my anecdotal evidence of being a loser can be proven mathematically? How cute.
Jab: "Why your friends have more friends than you do," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 96, No. 6. (May 1991), pp. 1464-1477. Check it out for yourself and see what you think.
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